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IntErnatIOnaL tErrOrIsM
A terrorist attack on one country is an attack on humanity as a whole. All 
nations of the world must work together to identify the perpetrators and 
bring them to justice.1
I. INTRODUCTION
 On September 11, 2001, hijackers used commercial airplanes as “deadly guided 
missiles” to attack the United States.2 Two planes slammed into the twin towers of 
the World Trade Center in New York City, causing their collapse, while another 
plane hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.3 A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania, 
never making it to its target.4 There were more than 3,000 fatalities. 5 Osama bin 
Laden eventually claimed responsibility for the attacks, although al-Qaeda, the 
international terrorist group he led, was almost instantly suspected.6
 Despite the magnitude of these attacks as well as their far reaching international 
implications, where bin Laden is captured may prove to be more vexing than how or 
when he is captured. Under the current international legal framework governing 
international terrorism,7 the locus of capture will dictate the extent to which bin 
Laden and other international terrorists will face a legitimate prosecution. For 
example, if bin Laden is captured in Saudi Arabia by Saudi law-enforcement officials, 
the United States may seek extradition under the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation for trial by U.S. courts under 
U.S. law.8 Saudi Arabia, however, could invoke its legal option under this convention 
1. Press Release, Kofi Annan, Sec’y-Gen., Sec’y-Gen. Condemns Terrorist Attacks on U.S. ‘in Strongest 
Possible Terms,’ U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7949 SC/7142 (Sept. 12, 2001).
2. Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Executive Summary 1–2 (2004), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/execsummary.pdf.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1–2.
6. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, In Video Message, Bin Laden Issues Warning to U.S., N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 30, 2004, at A1; see also Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., The 9/11 
Commission Report 115–16 (1st ed. 2004). Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council 
already recognized the threat of Al-Qaeda as well as the Taliban. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (condemning, inter alia, the Taliban’s safe haven for bin Laden and creating 
“the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee”).
7. “Terrorism is generally understood as a method of violence that is intended to ‘create a climate of fear’ in 
order to ‘service political ends’ by coercing a targeted group or government into acceding to the attackers’ 
aims.” Tim Stephens, International Criminal Law and the Response to International Terrorism, 27 U.N.S.W. 
L.J. 454, 457 (2004) (citing Allan Bullock et al., The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought 
851 (2d ed. 1988)). For purposes of this Note, this is how terrorism will be considered. See infra Part II.A 
(discussing modern international terrorism and describing terrorism at the international level).
8. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 
1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973; Ratification/Accession: the 
United States (Nov. 1, 1972); Saudi Arabia (June 14, 1974)). The Convention proscribes, inter alia, the 
aiding and abetting of individuals who destroy a commercial airplane in f light. See id. at art. 1, ¶ 2(b). 
335
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
to prosecute rather than to extradite bin Laden which, experience dictates, does not 
work to address the problem of international terrorism.9 The convention’s application 
to international terrorism has not only undermined the relevant international legal 
framework; it has also permitted international terrorism to remain an ever-present 
threat to international peace and security.
 This Note contends that the international community’s failure to define terrorism, 
and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare (the option to extradite or to prosecute), 
have combined to create legally legitimate safe harbor states for terrorists seeking 
refuge.10 States can ratify the multilateral conventions on terrorism and claim to be 
combating terrorism, while at the same time they are actually permitting terrorists to 
reside within their borders without any significant fear of prosecution for acts 
committed abroad. As long as the custodial-state party exercises its right to prosecute, 
regardless of whether it results in a legitimate prosecution or in any prosecution for 
that matter, the state party’s obligations under the respective multilateral convention 
are fulfilled. In essence, this result perpetuates the threat of international terrorism 
rather than triggers the legal mechanisms necessary to address the problems of 
international terrorism. Member states do not need to circumvent international law 
to provide safe harbor for international terrorists—the multilateral conventions 
themselves provide the mechanism to do so. While international politics and 
pressures may in some cases result in the extradition of suspected terrorists, the 
changing nature of world affairs may further thwart the primary goal of the 
multilateral conventions on terrorism: to consistently bring international terrorists to 
justice under a predictable legal framework.
 Part II of this Note lays out a basic history of modern international terrorism, 
particularly its rise in the last few decades, as well as the modern international legal 
response, including the multilateral conventions on terrorism. Part III then explores 
 Although the f lights were domestic, the Convention still applies since Saudi Arabia is not the locus of 
the planes’ registration. See id. at art. 4, ¶¶ 3, 6. All four of the planes were registered in the United 
States. See Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Registry Inquiry, http://registry.faa.gov/
aircraftinquiry/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (f light 11 tail number: N334AA; f light 93 tail number: 
N591UA; f light 175 tail number: N612UA; f light 77 tail number: N644AA). Since no bilateral 
extradition treaty exists between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the Convention serves as a legal 
basis for extradition, subject to the laws of the custodial state. See id. at art. 8, ¶ 1; U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Treaties in Force 236–37 (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123746.pdf.
9. See infra Part III.C (discussing Pan Am Flight 103). Although one legal scholar has claimed that the 
“United States does not want to have an effective multilateral scheme that would presumably restrict its 
unfettered political power to act unilaterally,” an effective framework is necessary regardless of a state’s 
political power because without such a framework, there is no real legitimate basis for which a state can 
act to enforce its political will. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-
Oriented Assessment, 43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 83, 92 (2002).
10. This Note is predominantly focused on the multilateral conventions on terrorism, as well as U.N. 
Security Council resolutions, as the bedrock for the international legal framework. While such a 
framework does involve various other mechanisms including bilateral treaties and individual states’ 
domestic counter-terrorism laws, the author has taken issue with the role of the conventions when 
serving as the legal basis for extradition—regardless of whether state parties actually have bilateral 
extradition treaties—as well as the source for domestication of the specified offenses.
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the catalysts for the creation of legitimate safe harbor states—the lack of a universal 
definition of international terrorism and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. This 
part also presents a case study of Pan Am Flight 103 as evidence that legally legitimate 
safe harbor states exist. Finally, Part IV addresses two essential solutions to the 
problem of legally legitimate safe harbor states for terrorists: (1) a codified universal 
definition of international terrorism, and (2) a reworking of the principle of aut dedere 
aut judicare, as applied to international terrorism, via a new dispute resolution 
mechanism that balances various states’ policies that may justify certain acts of 
terrorism. 
II. HISTORY—TERRORISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL QUANDARY
 A. Modern International Terrorism: Boundaries, What Boundaries?
 Terrorism is not a uniquely modern phenomenon. The term “terrorism” was used 
pejoratively for several centuries, “usually appl[ying] to ‘the other side.’”11 However, 
terrorism employed as a political idea was only first used during the French 
Revolution, when it was utilized by the French legislature to suppress the aristocratic 
threat to the revolutionary government.12 The move from terrorism as a modality of 
“state-perpetrated violence” to one of violence also carried out by non-state actors 
would not occur for another century, when the term was applied to the actions of 
French and Russian anarchists.13 Often, these acts of terrorism were the result of 
“coherent ideological platforms and aspirations” with a focus on specific targets.14 
Intentional attacks against innocent civilians were usually shunned in order to 
maintain “political legitimacy.”15 However, the rise of international terrorism—
terrorism not constrained by geographical boundaries—has been much more 
prevalent in recent years and differs from prior practices by the deliberate targeting 
of civilians in addition to governments. 
 Some experts believe that modern international terrorism began on July 22, 1968, 
when three armed Palestinians hijacked a commercial f light en route from Rome to 
Tel Aviv.16 Although this was not the first commercial airline hijacking, it was the 
first to be used to achieve political ends—the exchange of hostages for imprisoned 
11. Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law 
and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 23, 27 (2006). 
12. Id. (“The French legislature led by Maximilien Robespierre . . . ordered the public execution of 17,000 
people . . . to educate the citizenry of the necessity of virtue.”).
13. Id. at 28.
14. Matthew Lippman, The New Terrorism and International Law, 10 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 297, 302 
(2003) (citing Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism Trends and Prospects, in Countering the New Terrorism 7, 
8–10 (1999)).
15. Id. (citing Brian M. Jenkins, The Organization Men. Anatomy Of A Terrorist Attack, in How Did This 
Happen? Terrorism and the New War 9 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon Rose eds., 2001)).
16. See, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 63 (rev. and expanded ed. 2006).
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terrorists in Israel.17 The hijackers managed to put pressure on the Israeli government 
to respond to their demands, while also receiving significant media attention that 
today’s terrorists so often seek.18 Since that hijacking, international travel has become 
one the terrorists’ preferred instruments, allowing them to strike outside of their 
home countries19 Similarly, advances in technology not only permitted this increased 
use of travel; it resulted in more precise tactics and targets as well as the extension of 
media coverage.20 Thus, terrorism today is no longer confined to traditional state 
boundaries. 
 During the second half of the twentieth century, the nature of terrorism also 
changed.21 Terrorists began targeting innocent civilians as a means to achieve greater 
concessions from target governments and increased media coverage.22 They thrived on 
the fear they could generate by acting internationally, rather than nationally.23 Thus, a 
“hallmark” of international terrorism is “the ‘active’ use of violence in states not ‘directly’ 
involved in the conflict which results in ‘innocent’ persons becomming [sic] victims for 
‘political’ ends.”24 Moreover, “[t]he trend now seems to be [moving] away from attacking 
specific targets like the other side’s officials and toward more indiscriminate killing.”25 
Hence, the violent modalities employed by terrorists today do not always reflect the 
terrorists’ objectives.26 This is evidenced in such recent terrorist attacks as the September 
11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the 2005 
17. Id. at 67 (“[T]he express purpose [was to trade] the passengers they held hostage for Palestinian terrorists 
imprisoned in Israel.”).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 68.
20. See id. 
21. Although the causes of terrorism are not addressed in this Note, the causes of terrorism still remain an 
important element in creating an efficient and effective framework for combating terrorism. For a 
general discussion on the causes of terrorism, see Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 Comp. 
Pol. 379 (1981) (noting, inter alia, concrete grievances and no opportunity for political participation). 
Yet, at least one legal scholar has argued that the root causes of terrorism should not be taken into 
account. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works 24–25 (2002). It is possible that the 
politicized nature of terrorism has led to this disagreement about how to address the causes of terrorism 
because the recognition of “grievances” may legitimize terrorists’ causes.
22. See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 64 (noting that the civilians were often from different countries and not 
associated with the terrorists’ agendas).
23. See id. 
24. Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Overview, 13 Ohio N.U. L. 
Rev. 117, 124 (1986).
25. Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, 75 Foreign Aff. 24, 25 (1996).
26. See Young, supra note 11, at 29 (“[T]he relationship between the means employed and the terrorists’ 
ends is more attenuated than in the past.”). Likewise, it has been noted that “[t]he ideologically motivated 
offender of the 1960s will probably be replaced by new religious fanatics and political zealots of the 
2000s who care not for the harmful consequences they can cause no matter how catastrophic.” M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, Forward, Assessing “Terrorism” into the New Millennium, 12 DePaul Bus. L.J. 1, 16 
(1999) (internal citation omitted).
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London bombings.27 Just as their objectives are changing, so are the structures of 
terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations are now more fluid and rely on a more linear 
rather than hierarchical basis.28 As a result, terrorists may have more freedom and less 
restraint in determining their tactics, including indiscriminate killing.29 With this 
constant evolution of international terrorism, it is crucial that just as terrorism crosses 
borders, so should the responses to fight it.
 B. Modern International Legal Response: What Have We Done
 In response to the escalation of international terrorism as a serious threat to 
international peace and security, the international community30 began to take the 
necessary steps to criminalize the various methods of violence employed by modern 
terrorists.31 As a result, the international community has established several 
multilateral conventions, each targeting a specific tactic.32 The proscribed offenses 
27. See Young, supra note 11, at 29 (noting the increasing scale of such attacks).
28. See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 271.
29. See id.
30. For purposes of this Note, “international community” is in reference to states acting at the international 
level, either bilaterally or through various intergovernmental organizations. The author acknowledges 
that the international community does encompass far more actors and decision makers than just states, 
including governmental and non-governmental organizations, and constituencies. However, due to the 
focus on international law and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, the author chose to narrowly focus 
on states as decision makers in addressing the legitimization of safe harbor states in international law.
31. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 466. This approach is often described as “pragmatic” due to the international 
community’s failure to universally define international terrorism. See infra Part III.A (discussing the 
lack of a universal definition).
32. See infra, a list of multilateral conventions dealing with terrorist tactics. The full text of each of these 
conventions, including status information and the latest party signatories, is available from the U.N. 
Treaty Collection, U.N. Conventions Deposited With The Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&menu=MTDSG 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009). The multilateral conventions dealing with terrorists tactics are: Convention 
on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 
704 U.N.T.S. 219 (Entry into force: Dec. 04, 1969; 185 state parties; U.S. ratification without 
reservation: Sept. 05, 1969); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (Entry into force: Oct. 14, 1971; 185 state parties; U.S. 
ratification without reservation: Sept. 14, 1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (Entry into force: 
Jan. 26, 1973; 188 state parties; U.S. ratification without reservation: Nov. 01, 1972); Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (Entry into force: Feb. 20, 1977; 173 state 
parties; U.S. ratification without reservation: Oct. 26, 1976); Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11080. 1456 U.N.T.S. 101 (Entry into force: Feb. 08, 1987; 
142 state parties; U.S. ratification without reservation: Dec. 13, 1982); International Convention 
Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (Entry into force: 
June 03, 1983; 167 state parties; U.S. ratification without reservation: Dec. 07, 1984); Protocol on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 
1988, 3 pt 1 Dep’t St. Disp. 259 (1992), 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 (Entry into force: Aug. 06, 1989; 169 state 
parties; U.S. ratification without reservation: Oct. 19, 1994); Convention for the Suppression of 
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range from hostage taking and bombing to hijacking and financing terrorist 
activities.33 However, the mere existence of these conventions is not necessarily 
indicative of their recognition and approval as law. States must voluntarily ratify each 
convention, which enters into force (i.e. effect) and binds contracting state parties 
once the requisite number of states has ratified it.34
 Each convention appears to have been drafted in direct response to the increased 
use by terrorists of that particular tactic.35 For example, the first few conventions 
explicitly deal with violence in civil aviation due to the early prevalence of commercial-
airline hijackings by terrorists.36 Likewise, an increase in incidents of hostage taking 
and the targeting of diplomats led to the International Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons.37 One of the most recent 
conventions, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, deals with regulating common methods of terrorist financing, undoubtedly 
in response to the financial needs of terrorists for general operations and specific 
attacks.38 However, as the international community targeted a specific tactic, 
 Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1 Dep’t St. Disp. 59 (1990), 
1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (Entry into force: Mar. 01, 1992; 156 state parties; U.S. ratification without reservation: 
Dec. 06, 1994); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1 Dep’t St. Disp. 59 (1990), 1678 U.N.T.S. 304 (Entry 
into force: Mar. 01, 1992; 145 state parties; U.S. ratification without reservation: Dec. 06, 1994); Convention 
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
103–8 (1997), 2122 U.N.T.S. 359 (Entry into force: June 21, 1998; 142 state parties; U.S. ratification with 
declaration: Apr. 09, 1997); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 
1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–6 (2002), 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 (Entry into force: May 23, 2001; 164 state 
parties; U.S. ratification with reservation & understandings: June 26, 2002); International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, T.I.A.S., 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (Entry into force: 
Apr. 10, 2002; 171 state parties; U.S. ratification with reservation & understandings: June 26, 2002); 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 815 
(Entry into force: July 07, 2007; 60 state parties; U.S. signature: Sept. 14, 2005). Id. [hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the “Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism”].
33. See Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism, supra note 32.
34. This is standard practice for convention and treaty ratifications in international law. The ratification/
accession process is unique to each state and must be followed accordingly. For instance, under U.S. law, 
the United States usually does not become a party bound by a treaty or convention until it has been ratified 
by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. Thus, its signature alone does not necessarily 
legally bind the United States. Likewise, the extent to which a state party is bound may be limited should 
the state ratify with reservations to certain provisions. However, such reservations are not observed if not 
permitted by the treaty or if the reservation “is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.” 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (Entry into force: 
Jan. 27, 1980; 108 state parties; U.S. signature: April 24, 1970) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
35. See Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 7–9.
36. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 467–68.
37. Id. at 470 (noting the establishment of the two relevant conventions “following several attacks directed 
at diplomats and the dramatic seizure of the U.S. embassy and its staff in Tehran by Iranian students 
during the Iranian Revolution”).
38. See id. at 461.
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terrorists began to rely on different methods to achieve their ends.39 Furthermore, 
because the multilateral conventions target specific acts, individuals may actually be 
prosecuted under the relevant state law even though the actors are not really 
“terrorists” but may be acting for purely criminal ends.40 Nonetheless, these 
conventions go beyond just proscribing a specific act. The conventions usually require 
state parties to criminalize the proscribed offense in their domestic law and also 
create a legal basis for jurisdiction and extradition.41
 The most recent effort by the international community to criminalize international 
terrorism is the Draft Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism 
(“Draft Convention”).42 One legal scholar has described it as the most “ambitious 
initiative by the United Nations to elaborate a treaty-based definition of terrorism and 
to establish a comprehensive approach for combating international terrorism through 
international criminal law.”43 The ultimate objective of the Convention is to criminalize 
international terrorism itself, rather than to proscribe each of the specific tactics used 
by terrorists.44 However, there is a current debate as to whether the Draft Convention, 
once it has been adopted and has entered into force, will serve as the overarching 
counter-terrorism convention or as a supplementary convention to the other multilateral 
conventions.45 In addition, despite active work for nearly a decade, the Draft Convention 
39. Recent attacks have shown an apparent blatant disregard by terrorists for the conventions. See U.S. Dep’t 
of State, Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961–2003: A Brief Chronology (2004), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2009). Examples include: the 1998 U.S. Embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania; the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States; the 2003 
bombings of the Jordanian embassy and U.N. Headquarters in Iraq. Id.
40. For example, an individual who blows up a commercial airliner simply to commit murder and has no 
intention for third parties to respond in a certain way could still be tried under domestic criminal laws 
created under the applicable “terrorism” conventions. This is particularly relevant as some of the 
multilateral conventions have a “compulsion” element of the offense while others include it as a second 
type of offense, and still others do not mention it at all. Compare International Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages, supra note 32, at art. 1, with Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, supra note 32, at art. 3, and International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at art. 2. The compulsion element essentially 
requires the intent of the offense to be the compulsion of third party action in response to the terrorist 
act. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 32, at art. 1.
41. See Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism, supra note 32. See also Michael Reisman, International 
Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. Int’l L. 3, 28 (1999) (noting that the conventions “are 
essentially extradition and judicial assistance treaties”).
42. See Letter Dated 3 August 2005 from the Chairman of the Sixth Committee Addressed to the President 
of the General Assembly, Annex, app. II, U.N. Doc. A/59/894 (Aug. 3, 2005) (containing text of the 
Draft Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism) [hereinafter Draft Convention]. See 
infra Part IV.A (discussing the Draft Convention as part of the solution).
43. Stephens, supra note 7, at 462.
44. See Draft Convention, supra note 42, at art. 2 (punishing conduct “when the purpose of the conduct, by 
its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”).
45. See Mahmoud Hmdou, Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism: Major 
Bones of Contention, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1031, 1032 (2006). As aforementioned, individual states must 
voluntarily ratify or accede to treaties or conventions. See supra note 34.
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remains stalled, primarily on the issue of defining international terrorism.46 Similarly, 
particularly problematic issues—acts of self-determination, situations involving armed 
forces, and state sponsorship of terrorism—exist with regard to the scope of the 
convention; specifically, if or how the Convention will apply.47 
 In 2006, the U.N. General Assembly formally adopted the U.N. Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (“Strategy”).48 The Strategy essentially calls upon member states 
to actively combat international terrorism by undertaking various types of measures.49 
The measures, and their requisite actions, are categorized as follows: (1) “measures to 
address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism”; (2) “measures to prevent 
and combat terrorism”; (3) “measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat 
terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard”; 
and (4) “measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the 
fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.”50 One aspect of the Strategy calls 
upon member states to become party to the multilateral conventions.51 In September 
2008, the U.N. General Assembly reaffirmed the Strategy and called upon member 
states “to step up their efforts to implement the Strategy in an integrated manner and 
in all its aspects.”52 Thus, while ambitious, the Strategy does provide some guidance 
46. See Hmdou, supra note 45, at 1032–33. Issues include whether there should be a terrorist offense or 
whether there should be a definition of terrorism and a list of terrorist crimes. See id.
47. See id. Under international law, individuals have a fundamental right to self-determination. See, e.g., 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 (Entry into force: Jan. 3, 1976; 160 state parties; U.S. signature: Oct. 5, 1977) (“All peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”). See also U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 
2 (“respect for the principle of . . . self-determination of peoples . . . .”). Thus, this issue is predominantly 
focused on whether the Convention will apply to situations where individuals are exercising their 
legitimate right to self-determination. See Hmdou, supra note 45, at 1035–36. With regard to armed 
situations, there is concern that two parties to a conflict that engage in the same tactics, will be labeled 
and treated differently based on their status (i.e. “the dominant military power approach versus the 
‘patriotic’ power approach”). See id. at 1033 (“The historic and seemingly everlasting divide over who has 
the right to use force without being described as a terrorist have surfaced in the negotiations of the 
Comprehensive Convention from the beginning.”). See also infra Part IV.A (discussing the Draft 
Convention as part of the solution).
48. G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006). According to the United Nations, the 
Strategy is the “the first ever comprehensive, collective and internationally approved global framework 
for tackling the problem of terrorism.” U.N. Peace and Security Section, U.N. Action to Counter 
Terrorism, Fact Sheet Implementing the Global Counter–Terrorism Strategy (March 2009), http://
www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/CT_factsheet_March2009.pdf.
49. See G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006).
50. Id.
51. Id. at Annex, Plan of Action, ¶ 2(a).
52. G.A. Res. 62/272, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/272, at ¶ 2 (Sept. 15, 2008). See also The Secretary-General, 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Activities of the 
United Nations System in Implementing the Strategy, U.N. Doc. A/62/898 (July 7, 2008). Interestingly, in 
the preamble of the resolution, the General Assembly considers itself as “the competent organ with 
universal membership to address the issue of international terrorism.” Id. However, simply having 
universal membership does not mean there is universal consensus. See U.N. Charter art. 18 (voting 
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to both member states and U.N. institutions in order to take the necessary steps to 
not only combat international terrorism, but to prevent it as well. 
 The international community has also created several regional conventions and 
treaties, which seek to suppress acts of international terrorism.53 Since theses treaties 
are often between member states of “geographically regional organizations” or 
organizations “defined by religious or cultural affiliations,”54 they are limited in 
terms of coverage and enforcement. Likewise, due to the nature of the regional 
organizations, any criminalization of terrorism or specific tactics will often reflect 
the specific normative values of the organization’s member states.55 Many of the 
regional conventions are modeled after the multilateral conventions: covering 
proscribed offenses; establishing jurisdiction and extradition elements; and calling 
on the member states to combat terrorism.56 Also, many of the regional conventions 
often encourage their member states to become parties to the multilateral conventions 
on terrorism if the states are not parties already.57
 Finally, the U.N. Security Council has played a predominant role in responding to 
international terrorism, particularly because its resolutions are legally binding upon all 
member states of the United Nations.58 Although the Security Council has passed 
several resolutions over the years with regard to international terrorism, there is one 
resolution that stands out as being the most aggressive. On September 28, 2001, the 
procedures). Only two thirds of the majority is required when voting on issues of “maintenance of 
international peace and security,” which undoubtedly includes international terrorism. Id. at art. 18, 
para. 2.
53. See, e.g., Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism 
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That are of International 
Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1438 U.N.T.S. 191; European Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism, as amended by its Protocol, Jan. 27, 1977, 1137 U.N.T.S. 93; Convention of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, July 1, 1999, http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3de5e6646.html; Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention 
on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism, July 14, 1999, 2219 U.N.T.S. 179; Inter-American 
Convention Against Terrorism, June 30, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. No.107–18 (2005), 42 I.L.M. 19 
(2003). [collectively hereinafter Regional Conventions Against Terrorism]. Further information 
regarding the status and parties of these and other regional conventions is available from the U.N. 
Treaty Collection, U.N. Conventions Deposited With The Secretary-General Of The United Nations, 
available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&menu=MTDSG. 
54. Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law 142–43 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2006).
55. See id.; see, e.g., Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 2(a) (“Peoples struggle including armed struggle against foreign 
occupation, aggression, colonialism and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in 
accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be considered a terrorist crime.”); see also 
infra Part III.A (discussing the lack of a universal definition of terrorism and diverging normative 
values).
56. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, supra note 53.
57. See, e.g., id. at art. 3. 
58. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”). However, the extent to 
which a state party will be bound is usually expressed in the actual resolution.
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Security Council adopted Resolution 1373.59 Resolution 1373 extensively addressed 
international terrorism and the requisite steps that all member states must take in 
combating it, including denying safe haven to international terrorists.60 It also 
established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (“C.T.C.”), which is explicitly charged 
with monitoring member states’ implementation of Resolution 1373.61 Through this 
mechanism, the C.T.C. is able to identify existing problems and make necessary 
recommendations to the Security Council.62 For instance, in 2004, the C.T.C. observed 
that “the [state] reports submitted to the C.T.C. reveal that too many countries ratify 
these conventions without proceeding to adopt internal enforcement measures, without 
which these conventions can have no practical effect.”63 As a result of the binding effect 
of Resolution 1373, a state may still be legally obligated to combat and prevent 
international terrorism, regardless of its party status to any of the aforementioned 
multilateral conventions.64
III. THE CATALYSTS FOR SAFE HARBOR STATES
 A.  Lack of a Universal Definition: The Quandary of Proscribing an Undefined Concept
 Despite the international community’s efforts to develop an effective framework to 
deal with international terrorism, no such framework exists, and terrorism remains a 
threat to international peace and security. One of the main reasons for this failure is the 
fact that a universal “definition [of terrorism] remains elusive” at the international level.65 
59. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Resolution 1373]. The Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, 
Improving International Cooperation, U.N. Doc. SC/7158 (Sept. 28, 2001).
60. Id. at ¶ 2(c).
61. Id. at ¶ 6. All states must report to the CTC “on the steps taken to implement this resolution.” Id.
62. Id. at ¶ 7.
63. Annex to Note by the President of the Security Council, Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee on the Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), § 
II.C, U.N. Doc. S/2004/70 (Jan. 26, 2004). For a recent implementation update by region, see Letter 
Dated 10 June 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 
1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/2008/379 (June 10, 2008).
64. Resolution 1373 contains both compulsory obligations as well as general recommendations, which 
member states can take to help combat international terrorism. See Resolution 1373, supra note 59.
65. Christopher C. Joyner & Wayne P. Rothbaum, Libya and the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie: What Lessons for 
International Extradition Law?, 14 Mich. J. Int’l L. 222, 228 (1993). However, at least one author has 
suggested that while there is no universal definition, the patchwork of multilateral conventions and 
U.N. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions have actually provided a discernable definition 
of international terrorism. See generally Young, supra note 11. While some of the regional conventions do 
define terrorism, the definitions vary from specific definitions to simply identifying the proscribed 
offenses in the multilateral conventions. Compare Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on 
the Prevention and Combating Terrorism, supra note 53, at art.1, ¶ 3 (specifically defining terrorism) 
with Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 2 (identification of the
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Clearly, this has not been the result of a lack of motivation or attempt.66 Rather, the 
inability to define terrorism results from the international community’s failure to reach 
a consensus on what the definition should be and whether there should be exceptions 
to the definition.67 This is particularly prescient for states that consider some acts widely 
regarded as “terrorist” acts justifiable as acts of self-determination.68 Thus, the cliché 
that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter endures.69 Essentially, a state’s 
concept of terrorism—as absolutely illegal or illegal but justified—will often dictate its 
participation in international cooperation, including the apprehension and extradition 
or prosecution of terrorists apprehended within its borders.70
 The first efforts to define international terrorism began in 1937 in the League of 
Nations (“League”), the predecessor of the United Nations.71 The 1937 Convention 
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (“CPPT”) was the international 
community’s response to the 1934 assassinations of King Alexander I, the Yugoslavian 
head of state, and Louis Barthou, the President of the Council of the French 
Republic.72 The assassins were from Yugoslavia and it was alleged they were harbored 
by Hungary.73 As a result, the CPPT was focused on the nature of the terrorist act 
and its intended target, namely “the protection of heads of state and other public 
figures.”74 Thus, the objective of the CPPT was “to suppress acts of terrorism having 
 proscribed offenses in the multilateral conventions). Often, those regional conventions that define 
terrorism include an exception to the defined concept, which ref lects the larger debate over a universal 
definition. See, e.g., Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating 
International Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 2, ¶ (a). Thus, it would be unreasonable to state that 
specific regional conventions’ definitions represent a universal definition, especially since some of the 
definitions vary with respect to the elements included. 
66. See generally Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community’s Quest for 
Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 Cornell Int’l L.J. 491 (2004).
67. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 455.
68. See, e.g., Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 2, ¶ (a).
69. See Zeidan, supra note 66, at 491. The subjective nature of defining terrorism is more relatable in the 
following example: “No American would label the small band of farmers who first skirmished with the 
British army at Lexington and Concord in 1775 as ‘terrorists,’ however many Americans would label an 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) ambush of a British convoy ‘terrorism.’” Mary Beth Hansen, Extradition—
The Role of the Political Offense Exception in Combating Terrorism, 10 Suffolk Transnat’l L. J. 441, 
441–42 (1986).
70. See generally Alex Schmid, Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 375 
(2004).
71. John Dugard, International Terrorism: Problems of Definition, 50 Int’l Aff. 67, 68 (1974). The League of 
Nations was established by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles in an effort “to promote international 
cooperation and to achieve peace and security.” United Nations, History of the United Nations, http://
un.org/aboutun/unhistory/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
72. Dugard, supra note 71, at 68.
73. Id.
74. Id. (“In this respect the drafters were clearly acting within their terms of reference, namely the 
preparation of a convention ‘to prohibit any form of preparation or execution of terrorist outrages upon 
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an ‘international character’ only.”75 “Acts of terrorism” were defined as “criminal acts 
directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the 
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.”76 However, 
this broad concept of terrorism may have lead to the CPPT’s ultimate downfall—
only twenty-four states signed the CPPT and just one ratified it.77 So while the 
CPPT was formally adopted by some states, it never came into force.78 The onset of 
World War II and the subsequent dissolution of the League would further delay the 
international community’s focus on international terrorism and its deterrence.79
 The international community did not really reassess the threat posed by 
international terrorism until the 1960s, when terrorism began to reemerge on the 
global scene.80 In the years since, the United Nations has repeatedly attempted to 
define terrorism through a series of progressive conventions including, most recently, 
the Draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism.81 However, rather than set out a 
comprehensive definition of what terrorism is, these multilateral conventions speak 
to the tactics utilized by terrorists—an apparent compromise by states to criminalize 
some acts rather than to let the acts go unpunished.82 Thus, the acts, whether or not 
the life or liberty of persons taking part in the work of foreign public authorities and services.’”) (quoting 
Resolution, Council of the League of Nations, Oct. 10, 1936).
75. Id. at 68–69.
76. Id. (quoting the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League of Nations, art. 1, Doc. 
C.546 M.383. 1937 V (1937)). Likewise, Article 2 required contracting states to criminalize certain acts 
committed within its territory yet directed towards other contracting states and “if [the acts] comply with 
the test for terrorism laid down in Article 1.” Id. (citing the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism, League of Nations, art. 2, Doc. C.546 M.383. 1937 V (1937)). The offenses included:
 (1) any wilful [sic] act causing death or grievous bodily harms or loss of liberty to heads 
of state, their spouses, or persons holding a public position ‘when the act is directed 
against them in their public capacity;’ (2) wilful [sic] damage to public property 
belonging to another contracting party; (3) any wilful [sic] act calculated to endanger 
the lives of members of the public; (4) any attempt to commit one of the above offences; 
(5) the dealing with arms and ammunition with a view to the commission of one of the 
above offences in any country whatsoever.
 Id. (quoting the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League of Nations, art. 2, 
Doc. C.546 M.383. 1937 V (1937)).
77. See Dugard, supra note 71, at 68. There was also an apparent issue with the prohibition of some acts that 
could not really qualify as terrorism. See id. at 69. For example, “Article 13 outlawed the unlicensed 
transfer of arms and ammunition while Article 14 made it an offence to forge travel documents.” Id. The 
signature states were: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, France, Greece, Haiti, India, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Peru, Romania, Spain, Turkey, USSR, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id. 
78. U.N. Action to Counter Terrorism, International Instruments to Counter Terrorism, http://www.un.org/
terrorism/instruments.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
79. See United Nations, The History of the United Nations, supra note 71 (“The League of Nations ceased its 
activities after failing to prevent the Second World War.”).
80. See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 66–67.
81. See supra Part II.B (discussing the modern international legal response). 
82. See, e.g., Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism, supra note 32.
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they are really carried out by “terrorists,” are proscribed by international law and 
codified as crimes under domestic law.83 However, terrorism itself is not proscribed 
as a crime under international law.84
 While none of the multilateral conventions explicitly define terrorism, the recent 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, also 
known as the Terrorism Financing Convention, comes the closest by providing “a 
definition of terrorism in an indirect way” as a secondary offense.85 The relevant 
provision states in part: 
Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization 
to do or to abstain from doing any act.86
 However, the real criminalized act is the provision or collection of funds, which 
are then used to carry out the previously defined offense or an offense codified in one 
of the other multilateral conventions.87 This element of compulsion, also present in 
some of the other multilateral conventions, appears to be more concerned with the 
specific tactic of terrorism as a secondary offense rather than as an offense in and of 
itself.88 Also, the recent International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings, also known as the Terrorist Bombing Convention, asserts that individual 
state law cannot create justifications for the criminalized offenses:
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, 
where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the 
scope of this Convention, in particular where they are intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or 
particular persons, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature and 
are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.89
83. See, e.g., id. 
84. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 466. However, terrorism and terrorist acts are regularly condemned by the 
international community and usually by individual states, though this may depend on the nature of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident. See, e.g., Resolution 1373, supra note 59. 
85. Stephens, supra note 7, at 461. 
86. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 32, at art. 2, ¶ 
1(b). (emphasis added).
87. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1.
88. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 32, at art. 1. Clearly, a 
compulsion element is necessary for such an offense as for what other purposes would an individual take 
hostages other than to get a third party to act in his or her favor. See also supra note 40 (discussing the 
general issue of compulsion). 
89. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at art. 5 (emphasis 
added).
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 This ref lected an apparent desire to proscribe justified acts of international 
terrorism. Hence, this provision only creates an obligation upon state parties to 
refrain from permitting justifications to the specified criminal acts, rather than 
creating a criminal act of terrorism.90 Nonetheless, while the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention has entered into force, states are to free to exercise their sovereignty and 
refrain from ratifying it and subjecting itself to such a provision. 
 The inability to define terrorism is predominantly due to the fact that states have 
different beliefs about which acts constitute international terrorism. There is a general 
normative principle that it is wrong for an individual or group to use violence or the 
threat of violence against civilians to intimidate or instill fear in order to compel 
third parties to react in that individual’s or group’s favor.91 Despite this general belief, 
some states hold specific normative values in which there are exceptions to this 
general belief. These exceptions focus predominantly on motivations for these acts 
that are political, religious, and/or self-determinative. Thus, a state’s concept of 
terrorism and the nature of its criminalization may be dependent on whether the 
state chooses to qualify and make exceptions to the general normative value that 
terrorism is wrong.92 As such, even if a state generally believes that it is wrong to use 
violence as a means for change and voices its opinion to that effect, it may refrain 
from condemning or criminalizing a specific act if it believes that an individual’s 
motivations for using the violence were justified.93
 While it has been argued that this general normative value (i.e. the use of violence 
against civilians to compel third party action is wrong) provides a basis for the 
existence of a basic universal definition of international terrorism, such a definition 
would be essentially expounded as customary international law.94 The generally 
90. It is interesting to note that states may be party to both the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings, which explicitly rejects any justifications, and regional conventions that permit 
certain justifications, namely acts of self-determination. For instance, Algeria is a state party to both the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the OAU Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which explicitly creates an exception for acts of liberation or 
self-determination. See Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 3, ¶ 1. 
91. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 457. This general normative value is also present in those regional 
conventions that include a definition of terrorism. See, e.g., Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 1, ¶ 3.
92. See, e.g., Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 2, ¶ (a).
93. See Bradley Larschan, Extradition, the Political Offense Exception and Terrorism: An Overview of the Three 
Principal Theories of Law, 4 B.U. Int’l L.J. 231, 235–36 (1986). Although generally worrisome in the 
overall campaign against international terrorism, a state’s refusal to sign on to any one or all of the 
multilateral conventions is not as serious a test of legitimacy as a state’s ratification of a multilateral 
convention and its subsequent refusal to condemn terrorist acts or its positive reinforcement that some 
terrorist acts may be justified. 
94. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law, 4 J. Int’l 
Crim. Just. 933 (2006) (arguing that there is a generally accepted definition of international terrorism 
during times of peace, but not necessarily during times of armed conflict). For those who argue that the 
international legal framework can create a piecemeal definition, it must be noted that not all states are 
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accepted exigencies of customary international law arguably weaken this assertion as 
the ongoing debate regarding exceptions to or justifications for international terrorism 
go directly to the material aspect of terrorism—motivation.95 While both the U.N. 
General Assembly and Security Council have made statements that ref lect this 
general normative value and proscribe justifications for such acts, this is not necessarily 
evident of a custom.96 First, such resolutions—regardless of whether or not they are 
members to every convention, accept the U.N. General Assembly resolutions, or conform to the 
obligations outlined by U.N. Security Council resolutions. See, e.g., Young, supra note 11 (arguing that 
the patchwork of multilateral conventions and resolutions provide a discernable definition of international 
terrorism). Furthermore, even though there are some regional conventions that contain a definition of 
terrorism that ref lects this general normative value, these regional conventions are limited in scope, 
either geographically or culturally. Often, these conventions also contain exceptions to their definitions 
of terrorism. Thus, it would be unreasonable to state that a specific regional convention’s definition of 
terrorism represents a universal definition. 
95. A principle or norm may become legally binding under international law without specific codification in 
a convention. However, in order to become legally binding, such a principle or norm must qualify as an 
international custom. See Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38, ¶ 1(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. Article 38 of the I.C.J. statute states in relevant part that sources of international law 
include “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” Id. This statute has 
been interpreted to include accepted state practice (i.e. a state’s recognition of and responsive action to a 
particular custom) and opinio juris (i.e. a state’s belief to be legally bound by such a custom). See Mark 
E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory and 
Practice of the Interrelation of Sources, 47–48 (2d ed. 1997); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal 
Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. Int’l L. 
81, 134–36 (2001). However, the extent of accepted state practice (e.g. how many states and/or which 
states have accepted the practice) as well as the establishment of opinio juris are often the source of 
debate among international legal scholars. See generally Villiger, supra. Furthermore, a state’s persistent 
objection to the custom may relieve itself of legal obligations once the custom enters into law. See id. at 
33–37. Thus, for the general normative value (i.e. the use of violence against civilians to compel third 
party action is wrong) to serve as the international custom proscribing international terrorism (and 
therefore to be legally binding), there would have to be widespread recognition and responsive action by 
states to the general normative value, which there arguably is through such actions as U.N. General 
Assembly resolutions, regional conventions, domestic criminal laws, and condemnation of acts of 
“terrorism.” However, there would also have to be evidence that states’ believe themselves to be legally 
bound by the general normative value, which there arguably is not, as many states believe that there 
should be exceptions to the rule—essentially that violence against civilians may be justified in certain 
situations. Such exceptions create an inference that those states do not necessarily see themselves as 
legally bound, at least in situations regarding the exceptions, which in turn essentially defeats the 
foundation of the general normative value.
96. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/60 Annex I, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Feb. 17, 1995) (adopted without a 
vote). The General Assembly solemnly declared:
 Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a 
group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance 
unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them[.]
 Id. It should be noted that some of the regional conventions that do have exceptions for justified acts, 
particularly for the U.N.-recognized fundamental right of self-determination, were created after this 
resolution was adopted. See, e.g., Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 
Combating International Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 2, ¶ (a) (July 1, 1999) and Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 3, 
¶ 1 (July 14, 1999). Assuming arguendo that the resolution is supposed to prohibit any justification, this 
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legally binding—do not necessarily ref lect a consensus of the international 
community.97 Second, it is not clear that states view themselves as legally bound by 
such custom.98 At most, based on the widely adopted multilateral conventions as well 
as both U.N. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, it is possible that 
suggests that relevant states may not see themselves as legally bound by the general normative value if 
this General Assembly resolution is supposed to serve as a basis for customary international law. See also 
S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES, 1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). Resolution 1566 states in relevant part:
 Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke 
a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under 
no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such 
acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent 
with their grave nature[.]
 Id. at ¶ 3. However, both resolutions appear to focus on acts already criminalized (e.g. offenses in the 
multilateral conventions) and that those acts cannot be justified, rather than that these resolutions are 
creating a new criminal offense. Likewise, while Security Council Resolution 1373 requires states to 
criminalize “terrorist acts” in their domestic law, there does not appear to be any explicit definition as to 
what constitutes a terrorist act. See Resolution 1373, supra note 59, at ¶ 2(e). One legal scholar noted 
that “the lack of a definition was deliberate, since consensus on Res 1373 depended on avoiding a 
definition.” Ben Saul, Definition of “Terrorism” in the U.N. Security Council: 1985–2004, 4 Chinese. J. 
Int’l L. 141, 157 (2005) (citing Loretta Bondi, Fund for Peace, Legitimacy and Legality: Key 
Issues in the Fight Against Terrorism, at 25 (Sept. 11, 2002)). See also Saul, supra note 54, at 191 
(noting that “[w]hile there is a definite movement towards a generic definition over time, the divergent 
approaches to definition, and persistent disagreement over the scope of exceptions, have inhibited the 
emergence of a customary crime.”).
97. While most General Assembly resolutions are adopted without a vote, the absence of a voting record 
should not necessarily be interpreted to mean that a state adopts the sentiment of the resolution. Rather, 
such absence only ref lects that a request to record the vote was never made. See United Nations 
Documentation: Research Guide, General Assembly: Voting Information, http://www.un.org/Depts/
dhl/resguide/gavote.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). For a resolution to pass the U.N. Security Council 
and become legally binding on potentially every member state, only nine of the fifteen members 
(including the five permanent members) have to vote in favor of such a resolution. See U.N. Charter art. 
27 para. 3. Thus, while the Security Council is charged with addressing issues threatening international 
peace and security and its resolutions are legally binding, such resolutions do not necessarily ref lect the 
consensus of the international community. See U.N. Charter ch. V. 
98. See e.g., Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism, supra note 53, at art. 2(a) (“Peoples’ struggle including armed struggle against foreign 
occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in 
accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime.”) These 
would be the same states involved in the U.N. General Assembly resolutions and in some situations the 
U.N. Security Council resolutions. For instance, Bangladesh, Mali, and Tunisia, all members of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, voted in favor of Resolution 1373 while members of the U.N. 
Security Council. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-
Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International 
Cooperation, U.N. Doc. SC/7158 (Sept. 28, 2001). Hence, in the case of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, states may acknowledge that they are bound by the resolution itself, but not necessarily by 
the proposed custom within it.
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the proscription of specific methods of terrorism qualify as customary international 
law, but not the criminal act of international terrorism itself.99
 B. Extradite or Prosecute: What’s a State To Do?
 Under international law, extradition is a necessary element of international 
cooperation in combating international terrorism.100 Extradition is generally described 
as “the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a crime under the 
laws of one state is arrested in another state and returned to the former state for a 
trial or punishment.”101 Since there is no universal rule binding states to extradite 
accused offenders,102 the practice of extradition is predominantly founded upon the 
notion of mutuality.103 As such, extradition in international law is often codified in 
bilateral extradition treaties.104 However, multilateral treaties may sometimes serve 
99. See Saul, supra note 54, at 191 (2006) (“At best, there is international consensus on condemning 
terrorism, or support for a prohibition on terrorism, but which is insufficiently precise to support 
individual criminal liability.”). 
100. See Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and Global Terrorism: Bringing International 
Criminals to Justice, 25 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 493, 499 (2003) (“Extradition is vital for 
enforcing international legal rules and compelling respect for law and order.”).
101. Id. Extradition is defined as the “official surrender of an alleged criminal by one state or nation to 
another having jurisdiction over the crime charged; the return of a fugitive from justice, regardless of 
consent, by the authorities where the fugitive is found.” Black’s Law Dictionary 623 (8th ed. 2004). 
Under the multilateral conventions, the requesting state must have established jurisdiction over the 
offense. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at 
art. 6 (laying out the requisite steps state parties must take in order to establish jurisdiction over the 
offenses proscribed).
102. Joyner, supra note 100, at 500. Although it may be argued that the widespread and systematic practice 
of extradition may create a state’s obligation to extradite under customary international law—established 
by state practice and opinio juris—it has been long recognized that this is not so. See id. This is 
predominantly due to the varying nature of extradition and its corresponding treaties as well as the 
notions of sovereignty and a state’s right to conduct its internal affairs according to its own laws. See id.; 
Kathe Flinker Mullally, Combating International Terrorism: Limiting the Political Exception Doctrine in 
Order to Prevent “One Man’s Terrorism From Becoming Another Man’s Heroism,” 31 Vill. L. Rev. 1495, 
1504–05 (1986).
103. Antje C. Petersen, Note, Extradition and the Political Offense Exception in the Suppression of Terrorism, 67 
Ind. L. J. 767, 771 (1992). Mutuality is defined as the “state of sharing or exchanging something; a 
reciprocation; an interchange.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1046 (8th ed. 2004). Furthermore, extradition 
treaties serve the following purposes: “(1) to insure reciprocity in returning offenders to the country 
where the offense occurred; (2) to promote justice by cooperating in the apprehension and punishment 
of offenders; (3) fear that the offenders will commit similar crimes within the asylum state’s borders; and 
(4) to avoid international tension.” Hansen, supra note 69, at 444–45 (citing Barbara Ann Banoff & 
Christopher Pyle, ‘To Surrender Political Offenders’: The Political Offense Exception to Extradition in United 
States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 169, 173–74 (1984)).
104. See Joyner, supra note 100, at 499. Accordingly:
 [A] ‘generic’ extradition treaty contains: a list enumerating crimes for which both states 
agree to extradite offenders to each other; a clause that determines whether a requested 
state will extradite its own nationals; double criminality and prior jeopardy clauses 
(safeguarding the offender’s right not to be extradited if the crime alleged would not be 
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as legal bases for extradition, should no bilateral extradition treaty exist between the 
contracting states of the multilateral treaty.105 In theory, alleged criminals, including 
terrorists, would not be able to flee prosecution by escaping to another state.106 However, 
practice has shown that extradition is far from perfect, as various obstacles can prevent 
the successful extradition of criminals.107 With regard to international terrorism, 
extradition can be hindered by a number of obstacles including: the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare, the political offense exception, and state-sponsored terrorism.108
 The principle of aut dedere aut judicare—the duty to extradite or prosecute—is a 
component of extradition. The principle permits a custodial state,109 which has 
established jurisdiction over the offense, to exercise its sovereignty by either 
extraditing the alleged offender to a requesting state or prosecuting the alleged 
offender under its domestic laws.110 Although this principle is based in treaty law as 
 prosecutable in the requested state or if the offender had already been found guilty or 
discharged in a proceeding for the same crime); and a so-called political offense 
exception that often also includes a ‘political protection clause.’
 Petersen, supra note 103, at 772 (citation omitted).
105. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at art. 9, ¶ 
2 (“When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a 
request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested 
State Party may, at its option, consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the 
offences set forth in article 2. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of 
the requested State.”). This is significant as most states’ compliance for extradition requires a legal basis, 
either a statute or a treaty. See Joyner, supra note 100, at 500.
106. See Joyner, supra note 100, at 500.
107. See Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 240 (noting the concerns of “double jeopardy, double 
criminality, extradition of nationals, political sovereignty, and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare”). 
Generally speaking, states’ reservations upon ratification may also undermine the efficacy of a treaty as 
well as any particular provision, including extradition.
108. See generally Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65. For the purposes of this Note, the political offense 
exception and its resulting issues will not be discussed due to the more than ample coverage already 
provided. See, e.g., Richard Allen, Terrorism, Extradition & International Sanctions, 3 Alb. L.J. Sci. & 
Tech. 327 (1993); Flinker Mullally, supra note 102; Hansen, supra note 69; Larschan, supra note 93; 
Petersen, supra note 103. Essentially, the political offense exception permits individuals to avoid 
extradition for political offenses by allowing “[s]tates to block extradition on grounds that the acts were 
committed for a political purpose or with a political motive.” Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 243. 
Clearly, the political offense exception will swallow the multilateral conventions on terrorism if the 
relevant definition focuses solely on political motives or consequences. However, recent efforts suggest 
the international community’s preference for the political offense exception may be waning in the area 
of international terrorism. Compare Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft, supra note 32, at art. 2 (which includes a political offense exception) with International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at art. 11 (which explicitly 
prohibits the political offense exception as a refusal for extradition).
109. A custodial state is the state where the alleged offender is present. See Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 
65, at 232.
110. See Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 247. The enduring conception in aut dedere aut judicare evolved 
from the phrase coined by Hugo Grotius, a famous seventeenth century Dutch jurist—aut dedere aut 
punire, meaning “extradite” or “punish.” Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice by Cheating Death: The 
Doctrinal Collision for Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists—Passage of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare into Customary 
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it is included in at least seventy international treaties and conventions, there is an 
ongoing debate as to whether it should qualify as a norm of customary international 
law.111 As it pertains to universal jurisdiction for international crimes (e.g. war crimes 
and crimes against humanity), the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare is compulsory 
for all states regardless of their legal obligations or the source of law for the designated 
crimes—treaty or customary international law.112 Currently, the International Law 
Commission (“ICL”) has undertaken an effort to investigate whether aut dedere aut 
judicare may qualify as such a norm.113 Yet, states seem hesitant to extend the binding 
obligations of customary international law to aut dedere aut judicare due to its 
predominant formulation by treaties.114 Hence, aut dedere aut judicare has yet to gain 
the requisite status under customary international law to bind states regardless of 
their treaty obligations or lack thereof.115 
 With regard to international terrorism, the principle aut dedere aut judicare is a 
significant obstacle to the effective enforcement of the multilateral conventions.116 
The framework of the principle as applied to terrorist acts was first established in the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, also known as the 
Hague Convention or the Unlawful Seizure Convention.117 The relevant provision 
states:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found 
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever 
and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the 
Law & Refusal to Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 491, 496 (2003). 
Grotius is known as “the father of international law.” Id.
111. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 497. Such a qualification would impose a duty upon all states to either 
extradite or prosecute an alleged offender, regardless of whether or not the state is a contracting party to 
a treaty with such a provision. See id. at 497–98. A decade earlier, two legal scholars noted that this 
principle “is not an automatic customary rule of international law.” Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, 
at n.146.
112. See Alexander Zahar & Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical 
Introduction 496–98 (2008). “The universality principle can be defined as providing every state with 
jurisdiction over a limited category of offenses generally recognized as of universal concern, regardless 
of the location of the offence and the nationalities of the offender and victim.” Id. at 496.
113. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission, ¶¶ 345, 349, U.N. Doc. A/62/10 
(2007). 
114. Press Release, General Assembly, Legal Committee, Reviewing ‘Extradite or Prosecute’ Obligations, is 
Told Procedures Are Based on Specific Treaty Provisions, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3357 (Nov. 4, 2008). “The 
Sixth Committee is the primary forum for the consideration of legal questions in the General Assembly.” 
Sixth Committee Legal, General Information, http://www.un.org/ga/sixth/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2009). 
This appears to ref lect the highly guarded recognition of sovereignty in international affairs.
115. See supra note 95 (discussing the basic requirements for a norm to become customary international law).
116. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 467. Ironically, the principle was applied in order to ensure that custodial states 
have jurisdiction, even if the only connection to the jurisdiction is the alleged terrorist’s presence. Id.
117. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra note 32. See also Joyner, supra 
note 100, at 512 (noting the use of Article 8 of the Hague Convention as “the model extradition 
provision” for the future multilateral conventions against terrorism).
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case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those 
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any 
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.118
 Similarly, the Hague Convention gave rise to the precedent of designating the 
proscribed offense as an extraditable offense in bilateral treaties between contracting 
state parties.119 The recent Terrorism Financing Convention not only makes the 
proscribed offenses extraditable, but extraditable retroactively.120 By criminalizing 
the offense, a state can fulfill its obligation to prosecute—rather than extradite—an 
alleged offender by submitting the case to its respective authorities for prosecution.121 
In theory, aut dedere aut judicare suggests that no terrorist can escape prosecution by 
f leeing to another contracting state because that state would have the obligation to 
prosecute him if it chooses not to extradite him, regardless of the state’s reasons for 
refusal of extradition.122 However, the principle in practice dictates otherwise.
 A fundamental problem with the option to prosecute exists as it is laid out in the 
multilateral conventions because it is really only a “bare-bones prosecution 
requirement.”123 A straightforward reading of the relevant provisions indicates that 
the only requirement is that the case is submitted to the proper authorities for 
prosecution.124 There is no indication that the case must proceed past the investigative 
inquiry stage, as the investigation will be dictated by domestic evidentiary and 
procedural law.125 Another problem is that there will probably be insufficient evidence 
118. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra note 32, at art. 7.
119. Id. at art. 8, ¶ 1. Furthermore, contracting states have an affirmative duty to include the proscribed 
offense as an extraditable offense in all of its extradition treaties with other state parties. Id. Compare id., 
with the first convention to proscribe terrorist acts, the Convention on Offences and Certain Other 
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, supra note 32, at art. 16. However, this affirmative duty may be 
limited via a state’s reservation. See discussion supra note 34.
120. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 32, at art. 11, ¶ 
1 (including “extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States Parties 
before the entry into force of this Convention.”).
121. See Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism, supra note 32. The Tokyo Convention appears to only 
proscribe an offense and does not explicitly require criminalization; nor does it require aut dedere aut judicare. 
See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, supra note 32. 
122. A state may refuse extradition under the multilateral conventions for any almost any reason, as long as it 
prosecutes the alleged offender. For example, if a state refuses an extradition request on the grounds that it 
does not extradite its own nationals, it would still obligated to prosecute. See Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32, at art. 7 (“The Contracting State in 
the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without 
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”); see also Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32, at art. 8, ¶ 2 (“Extradition shall be 
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.”). 
123. Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 248.
124. Id.
125. See id. This argument ref lects a basic concept of burdens and their corresponding standard in criminal 
procedure as well as the differing evidentiary standards.
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available in the state seeking prosecution.126 So despite the principle of good faith 
present in all international treaties,127 two legal scholars have essentially labeled aut 
dedere aut judicare in its current application as “little more than a façade of justice.”128 
This concern is particularly relevant when the alleged terrorists are state–sponsored 
and have been found within the state that sponsored them.129 Thus, it is this façade 
of justice in combination with a lack of a universal definition of international terrorism 
that causes the legitimization of safe harbor states for international terrorists.
 Due to the lack of a universal definition for terrorism, which results from diverging 
normative values, a particular state’s election of prosecution over extradition may call 
into question the legitimacy of any resulting prosecution or lack thereof. This is 
particularly true when the custodial state has failed to denounce the terrorist act, or in 
some cases, actually sanctioned it. While some of the conventions require that state law 
prohibit defenses to specified crimes, the only guideline for punishment is that the 
specified crime must be punished similarly to other serious crimes in that state.130 It 
remains unclear whether the judicial process would permit mitigating circumstances to 
minimize the punishment to the point of delegitimizing the prosecution all together. A 
sympathetic contracting state party may elect to prosecute an alleged terrorist, knowing 
full well that the prosecution requirements are minimal and that an actual prosecution 
may never take place. Even more troublesome, if an alleged terrorist is prosecuted and 
subsequently acquitted or convicted with minimal punishment, the rules of double 
jeopardy as applied in international extradition law provide a basis for a state to refuse 
extradition for the same offenses. 131 Consequently, states do not need to circumvent or 
refrain from participation in the multilateral conventions in order to provide safe harbor 
for international terrorists—the law does it for them.
 C. Pan Am Flight 103: The Landmark Case
 On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103, carrying 243 passengers and 
sixteen crew members, took off from London’s Heathrow Airport en route to New 
York’s JFK Airport.132 At approximately 7:03 pm EST, the plane, traveling at an 
altitude of 31,000 feet, exploded in midair over Lockerbie, Scotland.133 All on board 
126. Id.
127. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, at art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.”); see also John P. Grant, Beyond the Montreal Convention, 36 
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 453, 458 (2004) (noting the operational presence of good faith in all treaties, 
but acknowledging a possible “naive” assumption of good faith with regard to prosecution).
128. Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 248.
129. See infra Part III.C (case study involving allegations of state-sponsored terrorism). 
130. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at arts. 4, 5.
131. Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 240–41.
132. Id. at 222–23.
133. See id. at 223.
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and an additional eleven townspeople on the ground were killed.134 Due to the nature 
of the explosion and the far ranging debris distribution, there “was immediate 
speculation that the f light had been sabotaged.”135 After nearly three years of extensive 
international investigation, the United States indicted two Libyan intelligence 
officers, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah and Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi.136
 At the time of the incident, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, also known as the Montreal Convention 
or the Civil Aviation Convention, was in effect.137 Libya, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom were parties to it.138 The Montreal Convention specifies the general 
offenses that jeopardize the safety of civil aviation.139 It states in relevant part that:
Any person commits an offense if he unlawfully and intentionally places or 
causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a 
device, or substance, which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage 
to it which renders it incapable of f light, or to cause damage to it which is 
likely to endanger its safety in f light.140
Since a formal bilateral extradition treaty did not exist between the United States 
and Libya,141 the Montreal Convention served as the legal basis for the requested 
extradition of the alleged terrorists arrested in Libya.142
 In response to the indictment, both the United States and the United Kingdom 
sought informal extradition requests for the two suspects from Libya.143 However, 
pursuant to its rights under the Montreal Convention, Libya refused extradition, and 
134. Id.
135. Nancy Jean Strantz, Aviation Security and Pan Am Flight 103: What Have We Learned?, 56 J. Air L. & 
Com. 413, 415 (1990).
136. Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 225–27 (discussing in greater detail the investigation and the 
evidence).
137. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32 
(entered into force on Jan. 26, 1973).
138. See Status of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/Mtl71.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2009) (Ratification/Accession: Libya 
(Feb. 19, 1974); United States (Nov. 1, 1972); United Kingdom (Oct. 25, 1973)).
139. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32, at 
art. 1.
140. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 1(c).
141. Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 227; see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force, supra note 
8, at 164.
142. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32, at 
art. 8. However, the extradition process is still governed by laws of the requested state—the state where 
the alleged terrorist is present. See id. 
143. Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at n.26. (“The U.S. extradition request demanded Libya surrender 
the two suspects to the United States for prosecution.”). At least one legal scholar has noted the 
difference between a formal extradition process and a demand for surrender of alleged suspects, which 
may have inf luenced the Security Council’s involvement. See Grant, supra note 127, at 461.
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instead elected to prosecute the suspects in its own courts.144 Given the suspects’ 
alleged ties to Libyan intelligence, the United States and the United Kingdom 
doubted the legitimacy of a Libyan prosecution.145 For this reason, the two countries 
went before the U.N. Security Council to seek an international inducement of the 
suspects’ surrender.146 In January 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
731, which urged Libya to comply with the requests for surrender.147 In March of 
1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 748, which declared that Libya’s 
failure to comply with Resolution 731 constituted a threat to international peace and 
security and imposed various economic sanctions on Libya.148 
 During this time, Libya sought to protect its rights under the Montreal 
Convention by filing claims against both the United States and the United Kingdom 
with the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”).149 In its application, Libya claimed 
that the United States and the United Kingdom could not compel extradition under 
the Montreal Convention because Libya was willing to prosecute the suspects itself.150 
Libya also sought interim measures to prevent the United States or the United 
Kingdom from taking action to compel Libya to surrender the suspects.151 In response 
to the claim for interim measures, the I.C.J. ruled that Security Council Resolution 
748 effectively took precedence over the Montreal Convention by means of Article 
103 of the Charter of the United Nations.152 The I.C.J. did eventually rule that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the cases under Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Montreal 
Convention.153 However, prior to the hearing on the merits, the proceedings were 
144. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32, at 
art. 7, which states:
 The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it 
does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the 
offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for 
the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner 
as in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.
 Id.
145. Stephens, supra note 7, at 475.
146. See id.
147. S.C. Res. 731, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992).
148. See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992).
149. Stephens, supra note 7, at 475.
150. Id. 
151. Id.
152. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial 
Incidents at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 126 (April 14); (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 15 
(April 14).
153. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial 
Incidents at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 115, 135 (Feb. 27); (Libya v. U.K.), 1998 I.C.J. 9, 30 
(Feb. 27).
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discontinued with prejudice154 after negotiations between the parties resulted in the 
suspects being tried under Scottish law by a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands.155 
In 2001, the court found al-Megrahi guilty of murder and sentenced him to life in 
prison, and acquitted Fhimah.156 Soon after, Libya agreed to pay $2.7 billion in 
compensation to the families of the victims in order to lift the economic sanctions 
imposed by the U.N. Security Council.157 However, this apparent successful 
conviction attained via other legal and political mechanisms would be short-lived.
 On August 20, 2009, just eight years after his conviction, Scottish Justice 
Secretary Kenny MacAskill authorized al-Megrahi’s release on compassionate 
grounds due to al-Megrahi’s diagnosis of terminal prostate cancer.158 Despite apparent 
promises to the contrary, Libya welcomed al-Megrahi home with open arms and 
cheering hearts, likening to more of a hero’s welcome rather than the return of a 
convicted terrorist.159 Similarly, at a meeting in Tripoli marking the tenth anniversary 
154. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial 
Incidents at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 152, 153 (Sept. 10); (Libya v. U.K.), 2003 I.C.J. 149, 
151 (Sept. 10).
155. Caryn L. Daum, The Great Compromise: Where to Convene the Trial of the Suspects Implicated in the Pan Am 
Flight 103 Bombing Over Lockerbie, Scotland, 23 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 131, 141–45 (1999).
156. Donald G. McNeil Jr., The Lockerbie Verdict: The Overview; Libyan Convicted by Scottish Court in ’88 Pan 
Am Blast, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2001, at A1. In 2003, a Scottish court ruled that al-Megrahi must serve at 
least 27 years before he can apply for parole. Lizette Alvarez, World Briefing Europe: Scotland: Lockerbie 
Bomber Must Serve 27 Years, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2003, at A6. Al-Megrahi appealed his conviction for a 
second time, and the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission granted al-Megrahi a right to appeal 
after observing that “a miscarriage of justice may have occurred” due to, inter alia, the credibility of 
testimony of a witness who had apparently been shown the defendant’s picture prior to a police lineup. See 
Lockerbie Appeal, London Times, May 22, 2009, at 4. During this time, Libya also requested that 
al-Megrahi be transferred to Libya to finish his sentence under a prisoner-transfer scheme. See id. In 
August 2009, al-Megrahi dropped his appeal and was released on compassionate grounds due to a terminal 
illness. Torcuil Crichton, Lockerbie Relatives’ Cautious Welcome for Review, Herald (Glasgow), Oct. 26 
2009, at 1; see also discussion infra note 158 and accompanying text.
157. See Felicity Barringer, Pan Am 103’s Bereaved Watch U.N. Lift Libya Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 
2003, at A2 (of the $2.7 billion, awards to victims’ families were up to $10 million per victim); see also 
S.C. Res. 1506, U.N. Doc S/RES/1506 (Sept. 12, 2003); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed on Libya After Terrorist Bombings of Pan Am 103, UTA 772, U.N. 
Doc. SC/7868 (Sept. 12, 2003) (the vote was 13-0 with France and the United States abstaining).
158. Lockerbie Bomber Freed From Jail, BBC News, Aug. 20, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
scotland/south_of_scotland/8197370.stm. Although MacAskill rejected al-Megrahi’s request for a 
prison transfer to Libya, he did heed the medical advice that al-Megrahi only has about three months 
left to live. Id. Prior to his release, al-Megrahi dropped his second appeal so that such grounds for 
release could be considered and eventually granted. Alan Cowell, Lockerbie Convict Drops Appeal, Seeking 
Early Transfer, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/15/world/
europe/15lockerbie.html (noting that in order for a prisoner transfer agreement to be authorized, there 
must be no outstanding legal matters). See generally Read the Lockerbie Files, BBC News, Sept. 1, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8232423.stm (providing links to relevant materials that 
have been released in relation to al-Megrahi’s release).
159. Alan Cowell & A.G. Sulzberger, Lockerbie Convict Returns to Jubilant Welcome, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 
2009, at A4; see also Minister Stands by Bomber Release, BBC News, Aug. 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8216897.stm. MacAskill claimed that “assurances had been given by the 
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of the creation of the African Union, the African members of parliament gave 
al-Megrahi a standing ovation, with the consensus that “he is the victim of 
international injustice and a policy of double standards.”160 However, reactions beyond 
Libya have been ones of agitation and disappointment by both governments and the 
family members of victims alike.161 Essentially, al-Megrahi’s sentence roughly equals 
just eleven days in prison for each victim.162 Immediately after his release, it was 
suggested that al-Megrahi was a bargaining chip between Libya and the United 
Kingdom in their dealings for oil and commerce.163 Although MacAskill and British 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown vehemently denied any “double dealing” and 
maintained the independence of the Scottish government in its decision, U.K. Justice 
Secretary Jack Straw admitted that al-Megrahi’s potential release under a prisoner 
transfer agreement did play a part in oil and trade negotiations with Libya.164 Even 
though al-Megrahi’s request under the prisoner transfer agreement was ultimately 
denied by MacAskill, apparently due to U.S. objections and perhaps due to this 
alleged tainting, it is fair to infer that the Scottish government may have nonetheless 
felt pressure to release him on other grounds, namely compassionate release.165 If the 
prisoner transfer agreement with Libya did in fact help ensure a £550 million 
(approximately $900 million) oil deal with BP, Britain’s largest company, then there 
would have likely been untold political and economic repercussions upon the denial 
of the prisoner transfer agreement absent other grounds for release.166 Thus, the mere 
Libyan government that any return would be dealt with in a low-key and sensitive fashion.” Id. In 
response to criticism that the celebration of al-Megrahi’s return was expected, Scotland’s First Minister 
Alex Salmond “denied it was naive of the government to think Mr. Megrahi would not be given a 
rapturous reception in Libya.” Id. (“I think when people offer assurances they should be taken and when 
they don’t keep these assurances, that’s not the fault of the Scottish government.”). However, U.S. 
Attorney General Eric Holder allegedly warned MacAskill that he “could get a hero’s welcome.” 
Associated Press, U.S. Warned Scotland Bomber Could get Hero’s Welcome, Boston Globe, Aug. 29, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/08/29/us_warned_of_heros_welcome_
for_pan_am_103_bomber/.
160. Africa MPs Cheer Lockerbie Bomber, BBC News, Sept. 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8247006.
stm. The double policy standards are in relation to the pardon and reception by the European Parliament 
of the Bulgarian nurses who were convicted of infecting babies with HIV in Libya. See id.
161. See, e.g., Lockerbie Bomber Freed From Jail, supra note 158; Majority ‘Oppose’ Megrahi Release, BBC News, 
Aug. 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8226585.stm; Obama Tackles UK PM on 
Lockerbie, BBC News, Sept. 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8249474.stm.
162. Eight years served of a life sentence divided by 270 victims. See Minister Stands by Bomber Release, supra 
note 159.
163. See John F. Burns, New Questions in Lockerbie Bomber’s Release, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2009, at A4.
164. See John F. Burns, Bomber Release Involved Oil, British Minister Says, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2009, at A13; 
Minister Stands by Bomber Release, supra note 159 (MacAskill: “It was my decision and my decision 
alone.”); “No Double Dealing” Over Megrahi, BBC News, Sept. 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/politics/8233009.stm; Straw Admits Lockerbie Trade Link, BBC News, Sept. 5, 2009, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8239572.stm.
165. See Burns, supra note 164; Straw Admits Lockerbie Trade Link, supra note 164.
166. See Straw Admits Lockerbie Trade Link, supra note 164.
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possibility and apparent probability that al-Megrahi’s release may have been for 
ulterior motives not only taints the fragile rule of law concerning international 
terrorism, it calls into question the ability of alternative legal and political mechanisms 
that could be utilized when the multilateral conventions fail.167 
 Although Libya may have been within its legal rights under the Montreal 
Convention to elect prosecution over extradition or surrender, the validity of such a 
prosecution called into question the legitimacy of aut dedere aut judicare. As 
aforementioned, the suspects allegedly had ties with Libyan intelligence.168 
Essentially, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 was seen as an act of state-sponsored 
terrorism.169 Hence, this was not simply an issue of trying one’s own nationals in its 
own courts; rather, it was an issue of the state trying individuals for acts committed 
on its behalf, and in reality, at its behest. In addition, Libya’s reaction to the allegations 
suggested that the prosecution would not have made it past the investigative stages.170 
Based on this evidence, it is fair to infer that but for the U.N. Security Resolutions 
and international pressure, Libya’s exercise of its rights under the Montreal 
Convention would have effectively barred the extradition of the terrorists to the 
United States or the United Kingdom. This would have made Libya a safe harbor 
state for the suspected terrorists. Furthermore, in regard to aut dedere aut judicare, 
international extradition practice suggests that the I.C.J. may have been more willing 
to side with Libya. First, “[s]tates are generally not required to surrender their own 
nationals for extradition in the absence of a bilateral treaty to that effect.”171 Second, 
167. Perhaps FBI Director Robert Mueller stated it best:
 Your action in releasing Megrahi is as inexplicable as it is detrimental to the cause of 
justice. Indeed your action makes a mockery of the rule of law. Your action gives 
comfort to terrorists around the world who now believe that regardless of the quality of 
the investigation, the conviction by jury after the defendant is given all due process, and 
sentence appropriate to the crime, the terrorist will be freed by one man’s exercise of 
‘compassion.’ 
 Letter from Robert S. Mueller, III, FBI Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Kenny MacAskill, Scot. Justice 
Sec’y (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel09/macaskill.pdf.
168. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 475.
169. See Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 231. State-sponsored terrorism is “distinguished from other 
categories of terrorism by the premeditated use of State agents for clandestine international activity that 
has been instigated, supported, or authorized by a legitimate national government.” Id. at 229 (citing 
State Sponsored Terrorism, Report Prepared for the Subcomm. On Security and Terrorism, 
for the Use of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st sess., at 58 (June 1985)). Even prior 
to the Pan Am Flight 103 incident, Libyan’s sponsorship for terrorism was well documented. See, e.g., 
Jane Chace Sweeney, State-Sponsored Terrorism: Libya’s Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 5 
Dick. J. Int’l L. 133 (1986).
170. See Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 248 (“Colonel Qadhafi has opined that the indictments of the 
two bombing suspects rely on evidence ‘less than a laughable piece of fingernail.’ He even suggested that 
Flight 103 was a victim of bad weather and happened to crash into a gas station.”) (quoting Qaddafi 
Scoffs at Demands for Bombing Suspects, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1991, at A11).
171. Id. at 241 (citing Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law 289–90 (6th ed. 1992)).
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Libya’s domestic law apparently prevented the extradition of Libyan nationals.172 
Third, under the option given in Article 7 of the Montreal Convention, Libya elected 
to prosecute the alleged offenders, rather than to extradite them.173 Because Libya 
had been willing to prosecute the alleged terrorists, the I.C.J. may have found the 
requirements of the Montreal Convention satisfied.174
 Although this case exemplifies the most objectionable application of aut dedere 
aut judicare—true state-sponsored terrorism—it demonstrates the seriousness of a 
state using its own specific normative values to justify acts of international terrorism. 
Even if a state does not actually sponsor terrorism by supplying resources such as 
funding and weapons, its specific normative values justifying certain acts of terrorism 
provides the rhetorical support and protection that goes much deeper and much 
farther than money and weapons ever could.175 While state sponsorship of terrorism 
is a legitimate concern for the international community with regard to safe harbor 
states, any justification of an act of terrorism by any member state should create an 
equally serious concern for the resulting threat to international peace and security—
legitimate safe harbor states. Furthermore, the fact that state sponsorship of terrorism 
acted as a basis for the U.N. Security Council’s actions suggests that but for the 
element of state sponsorship, these other legal mechanisms may be futile.176 This 
paints an even more frightening picture: If a state’s justification of certain acts of 
international terrorism is not enough to constitute state sponsorship of such acts, 
then the international community may lack sufficient legal and political means to 
enforce the multilateral conventions on terrorism.
IV. SOLUTION—UTOPIA VS. REALITY
 Finding an effective solution to the legitimization of safe harbor states in 
international law, as well as to the constant threat posed by international terrorism to 
international peace and security may, at times, seem quixotic or utopian. Nevertheless, 
the difficulty of eliminating legally legitimate safe-harbor states for international 
172. Id. at 251. If state law prohibits the extradition of nationals, the only permitted option under a relevant 
multilateral convention appears to be prosecution.
173. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32, at 
art. 7.
174. This inference has caused some to speculate on the tactic of seeking Security Council resolutions 
utilized by the United States and the United Kingdom in order to avoid disagreeable I.C.J. jurisprudence 
on this topic. See, e.g., Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 251–52.
175. See, e.g., On-Line NewsHour: Taliban Won’t Hand Over Osama Bin Laden, PBS, May 29, 2001, http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/may01/embassy_5-30.html. Abdul Anan Himat, a senior official at 
the Taliban’s information ministry, described bin Laden as “a great holy warrior of Islam and a great 
benefactor of the Afghan people.” Id. He also declared that “[w]e [the Taliban] won’t hand him over to 
America under any circumstances. It is our stated policy.” Id. The comments were made in relation to 
U.S. and international efforts to apprehend bin Laden for his role in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania. See id.
176. See S.C. Res. 731, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992) (noting concern over the implication of 
the Libyan government in Pan Am Flight 103).
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terrorists should not deter the international community from taking the necessary 
steps to address this serious problem. 
 A.  A Universal Definition of International Terrorism: A Nearly Utopian Concept, at 
Least for Now
 Codifying a universal definition of international terrorism is not a new solution.177 
Based on the voluminous literature on this topic, it seems that legal and political 
scholars alike have been working to identify the compromises necessary to break the 
international impasse.178 Yet, it appears that the international community is already 
moving in the right direction via the Draft Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism 
(“Draft Convention”). The Draft Convention essentially proscribes international 
terrorism as a criminal offense via a motivational qualification. It states in relevant 
part:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present Convention 
if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) Death 
or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) Serious damage to public or 
private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, 
a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; 
or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 
1 (b) of the present article resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; 
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act.179
 This qualification is meant to serve as a comprehensive definition.180 Unlike 
some of the multilateral conventions, the compulsion element is now the offense, 
while the results of the offense (i.e. death and destruction) are now elements of the 
177. See, e.g., discussion of the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism supra Part 
III.A. Codification of a universal definition in an international convention is preferred over codification 
or attempted codification via customary international law. While the convention may eventually serve 
as evidence of a custom so as to legally bind non-party states, the immediate impact of such a convention 
(once it has entered into force) will be to provide a legal mechanism for state parties: (1) to realize the 
possibility for prosecutions of such an international terrorism offense at the international level; and (2) 
perhaps more importantly, to minimize the aforementioned issues of aut dedere aut juidcare. While a 
state may exercise its sovereignty and refrain from ratifying the convention, a state can also persistently 
object to a custom, which in turn limits its legal obligation. As such, a convention would provide a 
stronger legal foundation, particularly when disputes arise.
178. See, e.g., Cyrille Begorre-Bret, Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law: The Definition of Terrorism 
and the Challenge of Relativism, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1987 (2006); Dugard, supra note 71; George P. 
Fletcher, The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 894 (2006); Ben Golder & George 
Williams, What is ‘Terrorism’? Problems of Legal Definition, 27 U.N.S.W. L.J. 270 (2004); Schmid, supra 
note 70; Gabriel Soll, Terrorism: The Known Element No One Can Define, 11 Willamette J. Int’l L. & 
Disp. Resol. 123 (2004); Thomas Weigend, The International Community Grappling With a Definition, 
4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 912 (2006); Zeidan, supra note 66.
179. Draft Convention, supra note 42, at art. 2, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
180. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 462. 
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offense (as opposed to the offense itself). Despite this advancement, concerns remain 
regarding acts of self-determination, situations of armed conflict, and state–sponsored 
terrorism.181 Currently, the Draft Convention acknowledges the right to self-
determination: “Nothing in the present Convention shall affect other rights, 
obligations and responsibilities of States, peoples and individuals under international 
law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
and international humanitarian law.”182 However, a recent statement by Pakistani 
Ambassador Farukh Amil, on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Conference, 
illustrates that there is still an ongoing debate as to the existence of this exception as 
well as its explicit acknowledgement in any resulting convention.183 Work on the 
Draft Convention has been ongoing for nearly a decade, even despite major terrorist 
attacks and the increased calls to combat international terrorism.184 
 In order for international terrorism to be universally defined, the international 
community must be sensitive to the diverging specific normative values of different 
181. See Hmdou, supra note 45 (noting that Organization of Islamic Conference negotiators sought “to 
ensure that the Comprehensive Convention contains a legal statement that its provisions shall not 
infringe on the right to self-determination”).
182. Draft Convention, supra note 42, at art. 20, ¶ 1. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (“The [p]urposes of the 
United Nations are . . . [t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace”). 
183. See EyeontheUN.org, OIC Group Statement on Agenda Item 99: Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, at ¶ 7 (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/7087_
OIC_terrorism_10-8-08.pdf (“The Group reiterates the need to make a distinction between terrorism 
and the exercise of legitimate right of peoples to resist foreign occupation and would like to stress that 
this distinction is duly observed in International Law, International Humanitarian Law, Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, and the General Assembly resolution 46/51 which endorses this 
position.”). However, if individuals are exercising this right to self-determination, they would still likely 
be bound by the confines of international law, including international humanitarian law and the 
prohibition of violence against innocent civilians. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
(Entry into force: Oct. 21, 1950; 194 state parties; U.S. ratification with reservation: Aug. 2, 1955). This 
article is also known as “common article 3” as it is present in all four of the Geneva Conventions and 
applies in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character. See also, e.g., Protocol Additional 
to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (Entry into force: Dec. 7, 1978; 
168 state parties; U.S. signature: Dec. 12, 1977) (“The situations [that are considered armed conflicts of 
an international character] . . . include armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination . . . .”). It must be noted that the Geneva Conventions apply to situations of armed 
conflict and do not apply during times of peace.
184. See Stephens, supra note 7, at 462. As a result, it is now common to see, either in the preamble or body 
of U.N. General Assembly resolutions countering international terrorism, recognition of the need for an 
agreement on a legal definition either explicitly or implicitly through an effective legal framework. See, 
e.g., G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006) (“Reaffirming further Member States’ 
determination to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention 
on international terrorism, including by resolving the outstanding issues related to the legal definition 
and scope of the acts covered by the convention, so that it can serve as an effective instrument to counter 
terrorism . . . .”).
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states as well as to the need for such a definition to legitimately criminalize 
terrorism.185 This is not to suggest that states should cower and give into the demand 
for exceptions to the general normative value; rather, states need to acknowledge 
such specific normative values so that there is legitimacy in the process as well as the 
definition and any ensuing convention. If a state feels that the definition is prejudicial 
to its specific normative value, the state may work to block the creation of any 
comprehensive convention. Even if such a convention were to be formally adopted 
over that state’s objection, that state retains its sovereign right to refrain from signing 
or ratifying the convention—resulting in a non-binding effect for that particular 
state. The successful solution to universally defining international terrorism hinges 
on the mutual respect between states regarding each state’s specific normative values, 
even if they disagree as to the extent the specific normative value should be applied.
 B. Tweaking Aut Dedere Aut Judicare to Work as Intended: A Step Closer to Reality
 The fact that international terrorism still remains undefined after several decades 
suggests that the international community should not delay in addressing the second 
catalyst of legally legitimate safe harbor states—the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. 
Simply because the option to extradite or prosecute has proven unworkable under the 
current legal framework governing international terrorism, there is no reason for the 
international community to completely dispose of the principle as inadequate. The 
fact that there is an ongoing debate about it achieving customary international law 
status suggests that this principle is here to stay, and that once that status is achieved 
it will then be applicable to international terrorism and will be binding on all states.186 
Regardless of the source of aut dedere aut judicare—whether treaty based or as 
customary international law—the fundamental problem still remains the same in 
instances of international terrorism: a state’s option to extradite or prosecute can still 
provide a legitimate safe harbor. Thus, it is in the international community’s best 
interest to adjust the principle of aut dedere aut judicare in the international terrorism 
context, rather than to simply create new avenues of prosecution, as the principle may 
still be applicable in those situations.187 The following proposed model suggests a 
185. When defining terrorism, there is an inherent risk that the definition may be too broad and encompass 
acts that are not legitimately terrorism as there is a lack of motivation for third party compulsion. See, 
e.g., Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism, 
supra note 53, at art. 1, ¶ 3(a)(iii) (“[A]ny act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party 
and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, 
any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, 
natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: . . . create general 
insurrection in a State.”).
186. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 497. 
187. Several authors have proposed different avenues of prosecution as a way to reach international terrorists. 
The propositions predominantly focus on the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), despite no clear 
jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism, or another equally competent international tribunal to prosecute 
international terrorists. See, e.g., Vincent-Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court in the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity, 
19 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1009 (2004); Todd M. Sailer, The International Criminal Court: An Argument 
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way for the international community to tweak this principle so as to delegitimize safe 
harbor states and renew its effectiveness in combating international terrorism. This 
model is based on the dual notions of dispute resolution and the underlying principle 
of good faith in all the conventions.188
 All thirteen multilateral conventions contain a provision for dispute resolution if 
a conflict of interpretation or application arises between contracting state parties.189 
For example, the Terrorist Bombing Convention states: 
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation 
within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to 
arbitration. If, within six months from the date of the request for arbitration, 
the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one 
of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, by 
application, in conformity with the Statute of the Court.190
States may seek the assistance of a neutral third party to properly enforce any part of a 
multilateral convention. This mechanism creates a model for dealing with contracting 
states who are questionably applying aut dedere aut judicare under the multilateral 
conventions.191 As such, the objective of this model is not to define international 
terrorism or to determine whether such an act qualifies as terrorism. Rather, the goal is 
to hold states accountable for improperly fulfilling their international legal obligations, 
as determined by their participation in the various multilateral conventions and the 
binding effect of U.N. Security Council resolutions.192 Moreover, this model necessarily 
provides a neutral intermediate step prior to the involvement of the much politicized 
U.N. Security Council, whose members may have diverging normative values in regard 
to Extend Its Jurisdiction to Terrorism and a Dismissal of U.S. Objections, 13 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 311 
(1999); Stephens, supra note 7. However, the supranational nature of international tribunals may deter 
sympathetic custodial states from extraditing alleged terrorists and may in fact spur the state to elect 
prosecution, which comes right back to the initial issue of aut dedere aut judicare. 
188. The principle of good faith underlying treaty obligations is codified and is arguably customary 
international law. See Vienna Convention, supra note 34, at art. 26.
189. See Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism, supra note 32.
190. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at art 20, ¶ 1.
191. The proposed model should be limited in its application to instances of international terrorism and if 
implemented, should not be extended by analogy to other international offenses. This model differs 
from a previous suggestion of creating international tort liability (for wrongful death, personal injury, 
and property damage) for those states who fail to extradite or prosecute. See William R. Slomanson, 
I.C.J. Damages: Tort Remedy for Failure to Punish or Extradite International Terrorists, 5 Cal. W. Int’l. 
L.J. 121 (1974). While damages may provide a civil remedy for inaction, it does not address the security 
threats posed by international terrorism. Furthermore, the proposed model is dealing with those states 
that exercise their rights in bad faith, rather than those states that simply do nothing.
192. A state must be a contracting state to the multilateral convention for which enforcement is sought. If a 
state is not a contracting state to a convention or has not signed on to the proposed dispute resolution 
model, it is not bound by either, though enforcement of Resolution 1373 could still be sought via the 
U.N. Security Council. See U.N. Charter art. 35, para. 1 (permitting member states to bring disputes to 
the Security Council if such a dispute could threaten international peace and security).
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to what constitutes international terrorism. Thus, a neutral third party provides 
guidance in terms of violations of treaty obligations, as opposed to politicizing an 
international terrorist act and the custodial-state party.
 This proposed dispute resolution model has a number of steps to ensure its 
legitimacy. First, it shall require a hearing by a neutral third party—an international 
judicial body such as the I.C.J.193 This hearing would examine a custodial state’s 
choice of prosecution over extradition if the requesting party alleges bad faith as the 
reason for the custodial state’s choice or subsequent inaction. The burden of 
establishing a claim of bad faith would be on the requesting party. It would be 
satisfied by putting forth evidence including, but not necessarily limited to: (1) the 
custodial state’s failure to fulfill its obligations under the relevant convention;194 (2) 
the custodial state’s clear sanction of the terrorist attack as the basis for extradition, 
or a general sanction over time of analogous terrorist acts;195 (3) as in the case of Pan 
Am Flight 103, evidence of the custodial state’s direct involvement in the immediate 
terrorist attack;196 or (4) evidence of the custodial state’s indiscriminate application of 
state law to avoid extradition.197 This burden should require the standard of clear and 
convincing evidence.198 The lower standard, a preponderance of the evidence, may 
deter states from signing onto this model as it could be too easily overcome, while 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not applicable as the judicial body is not actually 
hearing the criminal case.199 Once all the evidence is presented, the judicial body 
shall issue a ruling and subsequent remedial relief.
193. While the current dispute resolution mechanism gives jurisdiction to the I.C.J., it is not necessarily 
recommended that the I.C.J. act as the judicial authority due to the presumptively high number of 
cases—it may draw necessary resources from more pressing cases. Similarly, the I.C.J. has jurisdiction 
over a variety of cases. A specialized judicial body will offer the expertise and precision necessary for 
this highly charged issue. Thus, it is recommended that a new judicial body be created and its jurisdiction 
modeled after the I.C.J. See U.N. Charter art. 94.
194. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at art. 5 
(prohibiting justification or defenses to the Convention’s proscribed offenses). 
195. See, e.g., On-Line NewsHour, supra note 175. This is a general example of sanctioning terrorist conduct 
and not a specific example of the Taliban due to the intricacies of any pertinent conventions and 
Afghanistan’s party status.
196. See supra Part III.C (discussing Pan Am Flight 103).
197. Although a state’s law may prevent the extradition of certain individuals, particularly that state’s 
nationals, arbitrarily applying this law to avoid extradition may be seen as bad faith. For instance, in the 
Pan Am case, it was noted that Libyan law prevented the extradition of Libyan nationals. See Joyner & 
Rothbaum, supra note 65, at 251. If, however, Libya only applied this law to terrorism-related cases and 
not to other extradition requests, it would be an indiscriminate application. 
198. The hearing would be analogous to a civil or administrative case as it is a hearing based on a state’s 
alleged violation of international law laid out in its treaty obligations, as opposed to a violation of a 
criminal offense. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as “evidence indicating that the thing to be 
proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004).
199. Preponderance of the evidence can be applied as:
 [T]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number 
of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; 
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 If the judicial body finds that there is no presence of bad faith, the custodial state 
shall continue its investigation and/or prosecution of the alleged terrorist according 
to its domestic laws.200 While the requesting state is still free to use other legal and 
political mechanisms to exert pressure for extradition, this is not recommended as it 
would undermine the legitimacy of the proposed model. However, if the judicial 
body finds that there is bad faith, there are two options available. First, the judicial 
body shall request that the custodial state surrender the alleged terrorist to the 
requesting state or to a neutral state that has established jurisdiction over the case.201 
Thus, the custodial state still retains its sovereign right to refuse the judicial body’s 
request, and prosecute those criminals found within its borders. Second, if the 
custodial state refuses to surrender the alleged terrorist, the judicial body or the 
requesting state shall convey this refusal either directly to the U.N. Security Council 
or to the Counter-Terrorism Committee.202 Upon review, the C.T.C. may make a 
recommendation on whether the custodial state is in violation of Resolution 1373, 
particularly the provision of safe harbor to international terrorists.203 The Security 
Council shall then consider whether sanctions or other legal or political actions for 
violations of Resolution 1373 are necessary.204
 superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all 
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the 
issue rather than the other.
 Black’s Law Dictionary 1220 (8th ed. 2004). Reasonable doubt can be applied as “the doubt that 
prevents one from being firmly convinced of a defendant’s guilt, or the belief that there is a real 
possibility that a defendant is not guilty.” Id. at 1293.
200. This is obligatory unless the custodial state extradites the alleged offender. See Multilateral Conventions 
Against Terrorism, supra note 32.
201. There is no universal rule binding states to extradite accused offenders. See Joyner, supra note 100, at 500.
202. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (“If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent 
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken 
to give effect to the judgment.”).
203. See Resolution 1373, supra note 59, at ¶ 6. Resolution 1373 prohibits member states from providing safe 
harbor to international terrorists. Id. at ¶ 2(c). The fact that Resolution 1373 proscribes the provision of 
safe harbor does not undermine the contention of this Note. Resolution 1373 calls upon member states 
to ratify the multilateral conventions, if they have not already done so. See id. at ¶ 3(d). The multilateral 
conventions impose various obligations and duties, including the duty to extradite or prosecute. See 
Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism, supra note 32. Hence, it is arguable that a state’s submission 
of a case for prosecution would be seen as denying safe harbor. However, the aforementioned deficiencies 
of aut dedere aut judicare dictate that this may be a “façade of justice.” Joyner & Rothbaum, supra note 65, 
at 248. Finally, as the Security Council resolutions are binding upon members, regardless of their 
contractual status with the multilateral conventions, it would seem that the focus is on member states 
that have not ratified the multilateral conventions as well as states that sponsor international terrorism.
204. See U.N. Charter art. 41, 42. This would be analogous to Security Council action in the case of Pan Am 
Flight 103. See supra Part III.C (discussing Pan Am Flight 103). In situations where the custodial state 
that is acting in bad faith is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council (i.e. could veto any move 
for sanctions against itself thereby preventing such action) and that permanent member has vetoed any 
such action, the international community could exert pressure, either collectively or individually, via 
other political and legal mechanisms, namely a U.N. General Assembly resolution admonishing the 
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 This model should be adopted as a protocol to the multilateral conventions, as 
opposed to a binding Security Council resolution.205 First, the state would be 
subjecting itself to an international judicial body; such a grant should be made 
voluntarily.206 Second, all the multilateral conventions permit contracting states to 
absolve their obligations by withdrawing.207 If the Security Council were to adopt 
such a resolution, circumventing the need for consent, many states may withdraw 
from the multilateral conventions, which would do more harm than good.208 Similarly, 
states may react by becoming explicitly acquiescent to the presence of alleged 
offenders within their territories rather than pursuing and arresting them if they 
believe that they are being subjected to illegitimate and non-consensual jurisdiction.209 
member state and noting that states may take appropriate measures, not including self-defense. See U.N. 
Charter art. 10, which reads:
 The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of 
the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for 
in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations 
to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any 
such questions or matters.
 Id. Though such a resolution would not be legally binding, it would provide a basis for member states to 
impose sanctions. Furthermore, such recommendations would arguably not violate Article 12 of the 
Charter as the Security Council would not be seized of that particular matter due to a permanent 
member’s veto. See U.N. Charter art. 12, para. 1 (“While the Security Council is exercising in respect of 
any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall 
not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so 
requests.”).
205. In order for a state to ratify the protocol, it must be a member to at least one of the multilateral 
conventions and is limited to seeking enforcement of the conventions to those to which it is a member.
206. This is a general practice in international law. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 93 (“All Members of the 
United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”). Thus, since 
states had to voluntarily ratify the U.N. Charter, their consent to I.C.J. jurisdiction was voluntary as 
well. See U.N. Charter art. 110. Similarly, all of the multilateral conventions permit states to ratify with 
reservation its submission to the dispute resolution mechanism contained in the convention, likely due 
to the possibility that such a dispute will end up in the I.C.J.; some states do not submit to the I.C.J.’s 
compulsory jurisdiction. See Multilateral Conventions on Terrorism, supra note 32. A state’s reservation 
on compulsory I.C.J. jurisdiction is not presumptively conclusive that the state will not voluntarily 
consent to the proposed dispute resolution mechanism. 
207. See Multilateral Conventions Against Terrorism, supra note 32. See, e.g., International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 32, at art. 23, ¶ 1 (“Any State Party may denounce 
this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”). 
208. As long as a state is a contracting party to a convention, it is legally bound to fulfill the convention’s 
obligations, including the resolution of disputes via the I.C.J., unless it has reserved itself from such 
compulsory jurisdiction in which case jurisdiction may be sought on a case specific basis. This is 
particularly apt when there is no bilateral extradition treaty and the convention is providing the legal 
basis for an extradition request. Thus, it is basically the lesser of two evils.
209. Under the multilateral conventions, a state has an obligation to detain, according to its domestic laws, 
an alleged offender found within its territory for prosecution or extradition if it believes the alleged 
offender perpetrated a proscribed offense. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, supra note 32, at art. 6, ¶ 1. Under the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention, the state party also has a duty to investigate any information that an alleged offender may 
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Finally, should states elect not to consent to this new protocol, they would still be 
bound by the relevant multilateral conventions and/or Resolution 1373.210 Ultimately, 
the successful creation and implementation of such a dispute resolution mechanism 
will be determined by the international community’s willingness to make aut dedere 
aut judicare functional in the context of international terrorism.
V. CONCLUSION 
 Despite efforts by the international community to minimize the threat of 
international terrorism, the current legal framework has fallen short. At present, 
states do not need to circumvent international law to provide safe harbor—the 
multilateral conventions provide them with the mechanism to do so. The failure to 
universally define international terrorism, as well as the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare, have coalesced to permit contracting states to combat international terrorism 
only rhetorically, while providing safe harbor procedurally. Effectively solving this 
problem involves both idealistic and realistic solutions, including a universal definition 
of international terrorism and a dispute resolution mechanism. While these solutions 
will take time and significant effort to implement, it will be well worth the effort as 
international terrorism is not a new phenomenon, nor is it a fading one. International 
terrorism will remain a threat to international peace and security as individuals and 
groups (and even states) will persist in the use of violence as a means to achieve their 
ends, whatever they may be. The international community must find the will to 
effectively tackle the problem of international terrorism in order to diminish the 
threat that faces us all.
be present in its territory. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra 
note 32, at art. 7, ¶ 1.
210. Although this would essentially be the current status quo for a state party that refrains from ratifying 
the protocol, such a state may still be subject to the more general dispute resolution mechanism contained 
in the conventions for which it may still be subject to an unfavorable decision. And other states could 
use this decision as an inference that a state does not want the conventions to be legitimately enforced. 
As such, a state’s decision to refrain from participation in the protocol may provide impetus for other 
states to more forcibly apply other legal and political mechanisms.
